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The Promotion of the General Welfare: 
Using the Spending Clause to End the 
Criminalization of Homelessness in 
America 
DAVID STUZIN* 
The U.S. is experiencing a homelessness crisis. While the 
government claims that there are half a million people expe-
riencing homelessness in this country, the actual number is 
likely much larger than that estimate. Rather than investing 
in long-term solutions to homelessness, most states and mu-
nicipalities have responded to this crisis by criminalizing 
conduct related to homelessness—an expensive approach 
that perpetuates the cycle of homelessness and causes many 
people experiencing homelessness to needlessly suffer as a 
result. While advocates have fought criminalization in the 
courts, a problem of this size and scale cannot be solved 
through litigation alone.  
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This Note advocates that Congress could constitution-
ally end or substantially reduce the criminalization of home-
lessness by using the powers allocated to it in the Spending 
Clause. Notwithstanding the limitations the Court imposed 
on Congress’s spending power in recent cases such as Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, this 
Note argues that Congress may attach conditions to funding 
earmarked for or substantially related to homelessness that 
would require states to reduce or end criminalization within 
their jurisdiction. While not ultimately a solution to home-
lessness in the U.S., this Note advocates that only by taking 
criminalization policies off the table can the U.S. move to-





A. The Criminalization of Homelessness ..............................917 
B.  Judicial Actions ................................................................921 
II.  THE SPENDING CLAUSE ..........................................................927 
A. Early Spending Clause Jurisprudence .............................928 
B.  Dole, NFIB, and the Evolving Coercion Standard ..........933 
III.  CONDITIONAL SPENDING FOR ENDING THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS ...................................938 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................942 
  
2021] THE PROMOTION OF THE GENERAL WELFARE 913 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The fact developed quickly that the states were una-
ble to give the requisite relief. The problem had be-
come national in area and dimensions. There was 
need of help from the nation if the people were not to 
starve. It is too late today for the argument to be 
heard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the 
use of the moneys of the nation to relieve the unem-
ployed and their dependents is a use for any purpose 
narrower than the promotion of the general welfare. 
— Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo.1 
 
In March 2018, Tabitha Bass, a woman experiencing homeless-
ness in the City of Miami, jolted awake to the traumatic scene of her 
boyfriend, Chetwyn Archer, being handcuffed by Miami police.2 
When she protested, the officers informed her that she was arrested 
for “obstructing the sidewalk.”3 Ms. Bass had serious health issues, 
and during the three days she spent in jail, she had limited access to 
health care.4 This term in jail exacerbated her condition and likely 
lead to her unfortunate death a few weeks later.5 
As a person experiencing homelessness, Ms. Bass did not have 
a choice but to break the law in Miami by sleeping in a public space. 
A person experiencing homelessness is, nevertheless, a person6 and 
must sleep somewhere as a biological condition of their existence. 
Given the high price of housing in Miami7 and the low availability 
 
 1 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586–87 (1937). 
 2 Tarpley Hitt, Police Broke Rules While Arresting Homeless Woman Who 
Later Died, Activists Say, MIA. NEW TIMES (May 18, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/amid-miamis-homeless-crackdown-po-
lice-break-the-rules-and-a-woman-dies-10359984. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 295, 295 (1991). 
 7 RICHARD FLORIDA & STEVEN PEDIGO, FIU MIA. URB. FUTURE INITIATIVE, 
MIAMI’S HOUSING AFFORDABILITY CRISIS 3 (2019), https://carta.fiu.edu/
mufi/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2019/03/Miamis_Housing_Affordability_Cri-
sis_FNL.pdf (“Greater Miami ranks as the seventh least-affordable large metro 
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of shelter,8 Ms. Bass did not have any option that night but to “ob-
struct[] the sidewalk,” as police charged her with doing.9 As Jeremy 
Waldron pointed out in his landmark paper on the absurdity of such 
laws applied to people experiencing homelessness, “Since land is 
finite in any society, there is only a limited number of places where 
a person can (physically) be, and [a person experiencing homeless-
ness] would find that he was legally excluded from all of them.”10 
In other words, as Jacob, a person experiencing homelessness in Salt 
Lake City, explained, “[I’m] at risk of getting a ticket every 
night . . . . I can sleep on the sidewalk and get a ticket. I can sleep 
[across the street] and get a ticket. No matter where I go, I get a 
ticket.”11 
The criminalization of homelessness is a major human rights cri-
sis in the United States that, effectively, makes it illegal for millions 
of Americans experiencing homelessness to exist in virtually any 
metropolitan area in the country.12 Broadly, the term “Criminaliza-
tion of Homelessness” refers to laws, typically at the local level, that 
criminalize any conduct a person experiencing homelessness must 
engage in simply to stay alive, such as sleeping on the streets, uri-
nating in public absent public bathrooms, loitering, or sitting in 
 
(with more than 5 million people) in the world, trailing only Hong Kong, Sydney, 
Los Angeles, London and its suburbs, and Toronto and ranking one place above 
New York.”). 
 8 Isabella Paoletto, Luxury Housing Is Increasing in Miami. So Is Homeless-
ness, LATINO REP. (July 18, 2018), http://latinoreporter.org/2018/luxury-housing-
increasing-miami-homelessness/ (quoting Evian White De Leon, then-director of 
Miami Homes for All, a major local group working to solve homelessness in Mi-
ami, “[Government data on unsheltered homelessness in Miami doesn’t] reflect a 
much bigger story of how shelters are always full, how folks return to shelter, how 
women/children hide in plain sight, how The Homeless Helpline gets about 7,000 
calls per month for help, how folks get evicted, how people are cost burdened or 
severely cost burdened, how in the City of Miami there is an unmet need of 32,000 
affordable units.”). 
 9 Hitt, supra note 2. 
 10 Waldron, supra note 6, at 300. 
 11 Homeless Youth Aged out of Foster Care, INVISIBLE PEOPLE, https://invis-
iblepeople.tv/videos/jacob-homeless-youth-foster-care-salt-lake-city/ (last visited 
May 15, 2021). 
 12 NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS 
2019: ENDING CRIM. OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 9 (2019), 
http://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/HOUSING-NOT-HANDCUFFS-
2019-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS]. 
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public.13 Criminalization can also include municipal enforcement of 
laws that are arbitrarily enforced against people experiencing home-
lessness for crimes such as jaywalking or displacing people experi-
encing homelessness for public sanitation sweeps.14 Given that 
some variation of such laws exist in practically every jurisdiction in 
America, the legal system places people experiencing homelessness 
in an impossible bind: break the law by living in public or stop ex-
isting altogether.15 
Advocates on behalf of people experiencing homelessness have 
brought several challenges against such laws in federal court argu-
ing that, among other things, enforcement of such laws is a form of 
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amend-
ment.16 Even though some of these challenges have been success-
ful,17 they have ultimately been unable to stop cities from enacting 
more and more laws criminalizing homelessness across the United 
States.18 
Given the scope of the problem, a national legislative solution 
makes sense to coordinate the effort and push states to either remove 
such laws or reduce enforcement of them. One major problem with 
such a strategy, however, lies in the fact that laws criminalizing 
homelessness fall within a state’s police powers, generally thought 
to be reserved to the states.19 Thus, an order by the federal govern-
ment directing the states to end criminalization of homelessness 
could be unconstitutional, violating principles of federalism and ex-
tending beyond the bounds of Congress’s enumerated powers in Ar-
ticle I of the Constitution.20 
 
 13 Id. at 1, 12–15. 
 14 See id. 
 15 Waldron, supra note 6, at 300 (noting that “It would not be entirely mis-
chievous to add that since, in order to exist, a person [experiencing homelessness] 
has to be somewhere, such a person would not be permitted to exist.”). 
 16 See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Mia., 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561–65 (S.D. Fla. 
1992); Jones v. City of L.A., 444 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 
F.3d 1006 (2007); Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 17 See Martin, 902 F.3d at 1048. The Ninth Circuit in Martin sided with the 
plaintiffs in finding that the City of Boise’s ban on sleeping in public was uncon-
stitutional as a form of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. 
 18 See HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 12, at 12–14. 
 19 Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 778–79. 
 20 See id. at 777. 
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Congress, however, can overcome this limitation through its 
spending power.21 The Spending Clause grants Congress the power 
“to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States.”22 By attaching conditions to grants of 
funds to states, Congress has a long history of indirectly influencing 
state policy related to the general welfare of the United States.23 So 
long as such conditional grants are not coercive, meaning they do 
not force states to make the policy change, the Supreme Court has 
largely upheld such grants as valid exercises of Congress’s spending 
power.24 
This Note looks at the possibility of ending the criminalization 
of homelessness through Federal Congressional Legislation via the 
Spending Clause rather than, as most efforts have been focused on 
in this area, through challenges in the Federal Judiciary. Part I of 
this Note introduces readers to the criminalization issue and the his-
tory of judicial challenges advocates have brought against laws 
criminalizing homelessness; concluding with the argument that a ju-
dicial approach, in isolation, will not be enough to solve the prob-
lem. Part II focuses largely on the boundaries the Court has placed 
on Congress’s spending power and what can be done permissibly. 
Part III applies the Spending Clause analysis discussed in Part II to-
wards a practical solution aimed at ending the criminalization of 
homelessness in the United States. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Laws criminalizing homelessness, though enacted at the state 
and municipal level, are and should be a concern of and a priority 
for all branches of the federal government. Such laws affect, poten-
tially, millions of Americans’ rights and freedoms to exist, violating 
core American values enshrined in both the Constitution and the 
 
 21 See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 5–6 (1994). 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 23 See Engdahl, supra note 21, at 26–35. 
 24 See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587–90 (1937); South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987). 
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Declaration of Independence.25 This Part begins with a general dis-
cussion of the criminalization of homelessness and the significant 
costs—both human and economic—that such policies impose on ju-
risdictions across the country. It then moves on to discuss the history 
of federal judicial action in this space and why judicial decisions 
alone may not be enough to effect lasting change. 
A. The Criminalization of Homelessness 
While the number of people experiencing homelessness is diffi-
cult to measure, the number is likely much larger than the govern-
ment officially reports.26 To determine the number of people expe-
riencing homelessness, the federal government primarily relies on 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (“HUD”) point-
in-time (“PIT”) estimate of people experiencing homelessness in the 
United States.27 This number is an aggregate of local counts of peo-
ple experiencing homelessness conducted by a jurisdiction’s Con-
tinuum of Care (“CoC”), regional or local bodies that coordinate 
funding for homelessness services within an area.28 To amass this 
data, HUD first requires each CoC to report all people experiencing 
homelessness who are sheltered in local emergency shelters or 
 
 25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (no government shall deprive a U.S. citizen 
of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law”); THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (noting that all citizens are endowed with 
basic rights to “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”). 
 26 NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, DON’T COUNT ON IT: HOW 
HUD POINT-IN-TIME COUNT UNDERESTIMATES THE HOMELESSNESS CRISIS IN 
AMERICA 6 (2017), https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/HUD-PIT-
report2017.pdf [hereinafter DON’T COUNT ON IT]. 
 27 See Homelessness Statistics by State, U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON 
HOMELESSNESS, https://www.usich.gov/tools-for-action/map/#fn[]=1400&fn[]=
2900&fn[]=6000&fn[]=9900&fn[]=13500 (last visited May 15, 2021); see also 
U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, United States Interagency 
Council on Homelessness, https://www.usich.gov/ (last visited May 15, 2021) 
[hereinafter USICH] (USICH is main organ of government in the United States 
responsible for coordinating homelessness efforts across nineteen federal member 
agencies, including HUD, Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and Department of Ed-
ucation (“DOE”). Data it aggregates through its member agencies represents U.S. 
government’s official understanding of scale of homelessness in the United 
States.). 
 28 Point-in-Time Count and Housing Inventory Count, HUD EXCH., 
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/hdx/pit-hic/ (last visited May 15, 2021). 
918 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:911 
 
transitional housing in their jurisdiction “on a single night in Janu-
ary.”29 HUD then requires that CoCs, every other year, conduct a 
count of people experiencing unsheltered homelessness in their ju-
risdiction on that same night.30 Under the most recent count in 2019, 
HUD determined that on any given night 568,000 individuals expe-
rience homelessness.31 
The PIT methodology, however, likely undercounts the number 
of people experiencing homelessness in the United States by a wide 
margin. A study comparing HUD’s data with administrative data 
from various homelessness services organizations concluded that 
the number of people experiencing homelessness is likely anywhere 
from 2.5–10.2 times greater than what any PIT count suggests.32 
Critics of the HUD number point, firstly, to the fact that HUD’s 
guidance to CoCs on how to conduct the count is inconsistent year-
over-year resulting in “trends that are difficult to interpret and often 
do not reflect the true underlying data.”33 Second, critics contend 
that to obtain counts of people experiencing unsheltered homeless-
ness, CoCs typically have volunteers conduct visual street counts 
over one night—as if one night was sufficient to conduct a count of 
all the people experiencing unsheltered homelessness across the 
country.34 Further, these visual street counts typically miss many 
people experiencing unsheltered homelessness who sleep in places 
that are not visible at night.35 Thirdly, critics contend that the PIT 
count very narrowly defines homelessness, missing people experi-
encing homelessness who are “doubled up” with family or friends; 
or people experiencing homelessness who are housed in other 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 HUD, 2019 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR) TO 
CONGRESS 1 (2020), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/2019-
AHAR-Part-1.pdf. 
 32 Stephen Metraux et al., Assessing Homeless Population Size Through the 
Use of Emergency and Transitional Shelter Services in 1998: Results from the 
Analysis of Administrative Data from Nine US Jurisdictions, 116 PUB. HEALTH 
REPS. 344, 350 (2001). 
 33 DON’T COUNT ON IT, supra note 26, at 6. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. (noting that many people experiencing unsheltered homelessness stra-
tegically try to remain invisible at night given overwhelming number of laws that 
expose them to arrest if seen by police). 
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institutions such as hospitals or jails.36 This is problematic because 
many of these unaccounted for people experiencing homelessness 
will likely cycle between these forms of “shelter” and unsheltered 
homelessness, making them potential targets for criminalization 
laws.37 In short, by dramatically undercounting and estimating 
homelessness in this way, the U.S. government is tacitly expressing 
a policy preference for how to manage homelessness: keep it invis-
ible. 
The criminalization of homelessness is widespread in the United 
States, and many municipalities have passed at least some laws that 
criminalize homelessness.38 A 2019 survey of 187 major American 
cities found that 72% of cities have at least one law restricting camp-
ing in public, 55% of cities have at least one law prohibiting sitting 
or lying in public, and 51% of cities have at least one law prohibiting 
sleeping in public.39 Additionally, 83% of cities surveyed prohibit 
public urination and defecation, 76% prohibit scavenging or dump-
ster diving, and 55% prohibit storing property in public places.40 
While all of these laws, on their face, apply to everyone, those with 
a roof over their head inherently have the advantage of having some-
where else—a home—in which to exist. It follows that these laws, 
beyond their facial reality, disproportionately affect—or, more ap-
propriately, disproportionately criminalize those experiencing 
homelessness. 
That is to say, laws criminalizing homelessness are needlessly 
cruel and ineffective at solving the underlying problems of home-
lessness. Lacking a home, people experiencing homelessness must, 
among other things, sleep, eat, store their things, and use the bath-
room in public spaces. Consequently, while it isn’t illegal to experi-
ence homelessness anywhere in the United States, when municipal-
ities pass laws prohibiting such actions as sleeping or urinating in 
public––life-sustaining actions that a human must do to literally sur-
vive––they are, in effect, making it illegal for people experiencing 
 
 36 Id. 
 37 See id. at 12–14. 
 38 HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 12, at 105–118 (charting prohibited 
conduct laws that criminalize homelessness in 187 urban and rural municipalities 
across country). 
 39 Id. at 12–13. 
 40 Id. at 14. 
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homelessness to do the basic things they need to do to remain alive. 
These laws, furthermore, often worsen the situation of people expe-
riencing homelessness by saddling them with a criminal record that 
makes escaping homelessness all the more difficult.41 The United 
States Interagency Council on Homelessness (the “USICH”), the 
main organ of government in the United States responsible for co-
ordinating homelessness efforts across nineteen federal member 
agencies, notes the inefficiency of these policies in stating that 
“criminalization creates a costly revolving door that circulates indi-
viduals experiencing homelessness from the street to the criminal 
justice system and back.”42 
Beyond the human costs, laws criminalizing homelessness are 
expensive in their inefficiency. An economic impact study con-
ducted by the Berkley Law Policy Advocacy Clinic of Berkley’s sit-
lie ordinances, which are similar to such ordinances around the 
country, looked at the costs of police resources involved in enforc-
ing such laws, finding “that while economic costs [of such laws] 
may be substantial, economic benefits are uncertain and perhaps il-
lusory.”43 Beyond the costs of direct enforcement, many major mu-
nicipalities have faced large costs in the form of civil litigation 
brought on behalf of people experiencing homelessness in their ju-
risdictions.44 Finally, because these laws do not fix the underlying 
issues that cause homelessness, such as a lack of affordable housing, 
the cyclical nature of people experiencing homelessness getting ar-
rested and then thrown back on the street can quickly run up costs 
to taxpayers. A study conducted by Creative Housing Solutions 
found that giving “housing [to] just 50% of the current chronic 
 
 41 See id. at 64. 
 42 U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, SEARCHING OUT 
SOLUTIONS 7 (2012), https://www.usich.gov/resources/uploads/asset_library/
RPT_SoS_March2012.pdf [hereinafter SEARCHING OUT SOLUTIONS]. 
 43 Joseph Cooter et al., Does Sit-Lie Work: Will Berkeley’s “Measures” In-
crease Economic Activity and Improve Services to Homeless People?, BERKLEY 
L. POL’Y ADVOC. CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL. 1–3 (2012), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2165490. 
 44 See, e.g., Emily Alpert Reyes, L.A. Agrees to Pay Nearly $950,000 in Two 
Cases Involving the Homeless, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2016, 11:08 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-attorney-fees-homeless-case-
20160613-snap-story.html (discussing high expense associated with litigating 
challenges against enforcement of L.A. laws criminalizing homelessness). 
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homeless population in Central Florida over a multiyear period, with 
a 10% recidivism rate, would save the taxpayers a minimum of 
$149,220,414,” compared with the amount spent on enforcing laws 
that criminalize homelessness.45 Therefore, rather than spending 
taxpayer money directly addressing the root causes of homelessness 
(e.g., lack of affordable housing and social services) municipalities 
are simply hiding the much bigger cost of criminalization in the 
budgets of jails, courts, and law enforcement. 
Despite these costs, municipalities continue to pass laws that 
criminalize homelessness. Between 2006 and 2019, there have been 
major increases in all types of laws criminalizing homelessness in-
cluding a 103% increase in laws prohibiting loitering, loafing, or 
vagrancy; an 80% increase in laws criminalizing begging; and a 
78% increase in laws criminalizing sitting or lying down in public.46 
These laws allow politicians a quick and simple way to respond to 
complaints by a powerful contingent of business owners and prop-
erty owners about the visibility of people experiencing homeless-
ness.47 While there are more effective long-term solutions to home-
lessness, the short-term solution of criminalization is generally too 
tempting for politicians to ignore. 
B. Judicial Actions 
The foundational case in fighting criminalization laws is Papa-
christou v. City of Jacksonville, in which the Supreme Court found 
a vagrancy statute unconstitutional and void for vagueness under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause because it “fail[ed] to 
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contem-
plated conduct [was] forbidden by the statute,” and “encourage[d] 
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.”48 The result of this 
case is that it required legislatures to criminalize the specific actions 
 
 45 GREGORY A. SHINN, CENT. FLA. COMM’N ON HOMELESSNESS, COST OF 
LONG-TERM HOMELESSNESS IN CENTRAL FLORIDA 8 (2014), 
https://shnny.org/uploads/Florida-Homelessness-Report-2014.pdf. 
 46 HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 12, at 13. 
 47 Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminaliza-
tion, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 54 (1996). 
 48 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (quoting 
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)). 
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of individuals, rather than their identities.49 In other words, legisla-
tures could no longer pass ordinances criminalizing merely being a 
vagrant, but would be instead required to pass ordinances criminal-
izing specific actions that a vagrant might take. As a result, legisla-
tures passed ordinances that targeted specific loitering actions, such 
as sleeping in public or panhandling.50 And, while the Supreme 
Court has since struck down some such action-based ordinances as 
being void for vagueness,51 many of these ordinances have been 
found to be constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
persist to the present day.52 
Following Papachristou, advocates have since shifted to other 
avenues for striking down ordinances that criminalize aspects of 
homelessness such as the First Amendment53 and the Fourth 
Amendment.54 Advocates, however, have been most successful in 
arguing against the criminalization of homeless by using the Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence forbidding cruel and unusual punish-
ment.55 This theory developed, largely, out of the Supreme Court 
 
 49 See id. 
 50 Casey Garth Jarvis, Homelessness: Critical Solutions to a Dire Problem; 
Escaping Punitive Approaches by Using a Human Rights Foundation in the Con-
struction and Enactment of Comprehensive Legislation, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 407, 
420–21 (2008). 
 51 See City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 62–64 (1999) (finding a loitering 
law targeted specifically at gang members void for vagueness under Fourteenth 
Amendment because it both failed to give an ordinary person adequate notice of 
what is forbidden conduct and also afforded police an impermissible amount of 
discretion in determining who to enforce the ordinance against); Kolender v. Law-
son, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983). 
 52 Jarvis, supra note 50, at 421. 
 53 Homelessness advocates have used the First Amendment to invalidate, in 
some jurisdictions, ordinances that prohibit panhandling or that target loitering 
for the purposes of begging. See Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 878 (6th Cir. 
2013); Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d. 699, 706 (2d Cir. 1993). But see 
Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 903–07 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that an ordi-
nance that prohibited panhandling did not impinge plaintiff’s First Amendment 
rights because the ordinance only restricted panhandling done at night, in specific 
areas, or that was particularly “aggressive” as defined by the ordinance). 
 54 See Pottinger v. City of Mia., 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1569–73 (S.D. Fla. 1992); 
Lavan v. City of L.A., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1110–16 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding 
that city’s practice of confiscating and destroying the property of homeless per-
sons was an unconstitutional seizure under Fourth Amendment). 
 55 Jarvis, supra note 50, at 422. 
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decision in Robinson v. California.56 In Robinson, the plaintiff was 
convicted by both a municipal and appellate court under a California 
statute that criminalized the status of being a drug addict, even in the 
absence of any observable drug use at the time of arrest.57 The Su-
preme Court, however, overturned the conviction, finding that a law 
which “imprisons a person thus afflicted [of a narcotic addiction] as 
a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug 
within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, in-
flicts a cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments.58 
The holding in Robinson was subsequently interpreted in Powell 
v. Texas.59 There, the Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the 
plaintiff, an alcoholic who, by definition, could not control his alco-
hol addiction, could be convicted under a public drunkenness statute 
without that conviction being viewed as cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment.60 The plurality distinguished 
Powell from Robinson by arguing that in Robinson, the plaintiff was 
convicted solely for his status as a drug user, whereas in Powell, the 
plaintiff was convicted for the action of being drunk in public.61 Jus-
tice White’s concurrence in Powell is particularly noteworthy in ref-
erence to the criminalization of the homeless because it suggests that 
the plaintiff was only guilty because he did not have to get drunk in 
public, but, rather, could choose to be drunk in the privacy of his 
own home: 
Although many chronics have homes, many others 
do not. For all practical purposes the public streets 
may be home for these unfortunates, not because 
their disease compels them to be there, but because, 
drunk or sober, they have no place else to go and no 
place else to be when they are drinking.62 
 
 56 Id.; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 57 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661–64. 
 58 Id. at 667. 
 59 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
 60 Id. at 532. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 551 (White, J., concurring). 
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Taking up White’s concurrence, some advocates have sought to 
use this jurisprudence to forbid cities from enforcing certain laws 
criminalizing homelessness. In both Jones v. City of Los Angeles 
and Martin v. City of Boise, plaintiffs, people experiencing home-
lessness in Los Angles and Boise respectively, sought to challenge 
city ordinances that outlawed sleeping or camping in public.63 In 
both cases the district court ruled for the city, and, in both cases, the 
ruling was overturned by the Ninth Circuit for violating the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.64 Whether this 
strain of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence will hold up in other cir-
cuits or in front of the Supreme Court is hitherto an open question, 
as, in December 2019, the Supreme Court declined to review Mar-
tin, leaving that ruling in effect.65 
Some advocates have used court victories to work with cities to 
strike a settlement agreement rather than enact an all-out ban on any 
particular type of law criminalizing homelessness; Jones is an ex-
ample of this strategy, as that ruling was vacated following a settle-
ment agreement between the parties,66 in which the city of Los An-
geles agreed to not enforce sleeping bans between 9 P.M. and 6 
A.M.67 In a similar earlier case, the City of Miami agreed to abide 
by a consent decree issued by a district court after losing the 1992 
case of Pottinger v. City of Miami to advocates challenging the city’s 
draconian enforcement of criminalization laws.68 The consent de-
cree included, among other things, the right for people experiencing 
homelessness to be offered shelter before being moved by the po-
lice; the right to be warned before being arrested for minor conduct 
crimes; and the right to certain property protections during street 
clean-ups.69 
 
 63 Jones v. City of L.A., 444 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 
F.3d 1006 (2007); Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 64 Jones, 444 F.3d at 1125, 1136–38; Martin, 902 F.3d at 1036, 1048. 
 65 City of Boise v. Martin, 140 S. Ct. 674, 2019 WL 6833408, at *1 (Dec. 16, 
2019) (mem.). 
 66 Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 505 F.3d 1006, 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 67 Susan Shelley, Los Angeles Is Right to Back Away from the Jones Settle-
ment, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (June 26, 2018), https://www.ocregis-
ter.com/2018/06/26/los-angeles-backs-away-from-the-jones-settlement/. 
 68 Settlement Agreement at 1, Pottinger v. City of Mia., No. 88-2406-CIV-
ATKINS (S.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 1998), ECF No. 382. 
 69 Id. at 7–13. 
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Despite these successes, there are several reasons to be skeptical 
of a complete end to the criminalization of homelessness arising out 
of the federal judiciary. For one, the problem of criminalization is 
largely an issue of state and local police powers,70 a fact which the 
Supreme Court has, in the past, deferred to in some Eighth Amend-
ment cases.71 The plurality in Powell, for example, explicitly nar-
rowed Robinson’s holding for precisely this reason: 
The doctrines of [substantive criminal law] have his-
torically provided the tools for a constantly shifting 
adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims 
of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, 
philosophical, and medical views of the nature of 
man. This process of adjustment has always been 
thought to be the province of the States.72 
Moreover, cases like Martin only stop municipalities from enforcing 
certain laws, rather than winning an outright ban on policies crimi-
nalizing homelessness.73 While the city of Boise, for example, is 
barred from enforcing sleeping- and camping-in-public against peo-
ple experiencing homelessness, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling didn’t 
“nullif[y] the range of laws that punish homeless people.”74 Thus, 
given the large volume of laws criminalizing homelessness across 
municipalities, even advocates in circuits friendly to Eighth Amend-
ment arguments might find themselves having to play a game of ju-
dicial whack-a-mole to get all such laws found unconstitutional.75 
Finally, in cases in which advocates settled for equitable relief 
or settlements, those forms of relief are tenuous and can be over-
turned by subsequent actions when tensions mount for cities to make 
homelessness less visible. This was true in Jones where, in 2018, 
 
 70 See Legarre, supra note 19, at 778–79. 
 71 See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968). 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Eighth Amendment — Criminalization of Homelessness — Ninth Cir-
cuit Refuses to Reconsider Invalidation of Ordinances Completely Banning Sleep-
ing and Camping in Public, 133 HARV. L. REV. 699, 703 [hereinafter Eighth 
Amendment — Criminalization of Homelessness]. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See generally HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 12, at 105–118 (list-
ing the wide array of prohibited conduct criminalized in cities across the United 
States). 
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Los Angeles’s mayor Eric Garcetti announced his intention to back 
away from the Jones settlement, which had allowed people experi-
encing homelessness to sleep in public between 9 P.M. and 6 A.M. 
for eleven years.76 This was also true in Miami, where the Pottinger 
consent decree could not stand up to city pressure to manage com-
munities experiencing homelessness.77 In 2019, twenty years after 
the initial settlement went into effect, the Southern District of Flor-
ida ruled that the City had substantially complied with the mandates 
of the consent decree and allowed it to be dissolved.78 The court 
came to this conclusion despite the testimony of numerous people 
experiencing homelessness who each recounted several times when 
police and city officials routinely violated many of the consent de-
cree’s provisions.79 If the Southern District’s opinion is allowed to 
stand, it follows that there is nothing in place to stop the City from 
once again pursuing a strategy of criminalizing homelessness if the 
City so chooses. 
Despite these issues, advocates should continue to pursue judi-
cial action because they do often produce substantial benefits for 
people experiencing homelessness. In Pottinger, for example, even 
though the consent decree was eventually terminated, it did lead to 
initiatives such as the passing of a food and beverage tax, which help 
fund a number of homelessness programs within Miami’s CoC net-
work.80 Similarly, in both Jones and Martin the litigation was im-
portant in both raising awareness of the issues of criminalization and 
in effecting some concrete changes.81 Given the issues discussed 
above, however, federal judicial solutions, in isolation, will likely 
not be enough to solve the problem of criminalization in the United 
States. 
 
 76 Shelley, supra note 67. 
 77 See generally Pottinger v. City of Miami, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (S.D. Fla. 
2019). 
 78 Id. at 1195–99. 
 79 Id. at 1191–93. 
 80 Id. at 1183–88. 
 81 See Shelley, supra note 67; Eighth Amendment — Criminalization of 
Homelessness, supra note 73, at 706. 
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II. THE SPENDING CLAUSE 
Given the scope of criminalization and its significant costs, ad-
vocates might see more success in pushing politicians in the federal 
legislature to attempt to address the issue head-on. This Note advo-
cates that one effective and politically feasible way for Congress to 
accomplish this would be through incentivizing states through stra-
tegic use of the Spending Clause. Before discussing this, however, 
this Note reviews the history of the Spending Clause so as to illus-
trate how it can be properly used to incentivize change in state pol-
icy. 
The Constitution grants Congress the power “to pay the Debts 
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States . . . .”82 This clause, known as the Spending Clause, 
generally allows Congress to spend money as it sees fit and has fre-
quently been utilized by Congress to incentivize state-level policy, 
particularly with respect to granting state funding subject to various 
conditions.83 Congress has, in fact, done this on a number of occa-
sions to advance policy objectives on the state level such as elimi-
nating racial discrimination84 and promoting policies that help the 
handicapped.85 Thus, in theory, if Congress wanted to, the federal 
legislature could appropriate state and municipal funding for various 
programs on the condition that states and municipalities reduce en-
forcement of laws criminalizing homelessness and divert funds to 
less harsh forms of managing people experiencing homelessness. 
While this might sound straightforward, this use of the Spending 
Clause is a quite controversial area of Constitutional law. As far 
back as the time of the Founders, the bounds of Congress’s Article 
I enumerated powers have been a large point of controversy, and 
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison debated the issue shortly 
after the Constitution was ratified.86 Those generally opposed to 
 
 82 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 83 See Mark Seidenfeld, The Bounds of Congress’s Spending Power, 61 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (2019). 
 84 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
 85 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
 86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 34 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that Congress’s 
powers are plenary when pursuing national ends; to put limitations on these pow-
ers would be, “to a sacrifice of the great interests of the union to the power of the 
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such usage point out that in many cases, such conditions circumvent 
Congress’s clearly enumerated powers in Article I and inappropri-
ately encroach on police powers reserved to the states.87 Proponents 
of such usage point to the fact that the language of the Spending 
Clause allows Congress to “provide for the . . . general Welfare of 
the United States,”88 which could be interpreted to allow Congress 
to spend for purposes beyond the enumerated powers.89 
As noted above, while Congress has, in many cases, used the 
Spending Clause to permissibly incentivize states to change local 
policy, recent Supreme Court cases have put substantial limitations 
on what Congress may do. If advocates are to lobby for legislative 
solutions to the criminalization of the homelessness, or, truly, any 
cause, understanding how these limitations work will be key to 
avoiding potential barriers in the courts. This Part lays out the his-
tory of Spending Clause jurisprudence and examines, first, the con-
ventional understanding of the Spending Clause doctrine as applied 
to conditional grants of federal funds. This Part then discusses how 
Spending Clause doctrine has evolved in the modern era through the 
seminal cases of South Dakota v. Dole90 and National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB”).91 
A. Early Spending Clause Jurisprudence 
Arguments over Congressional enactments that circumvent Ar-
ticle I’s enumerated powers are as old as the United States itself. 
While delegates at the 1787 Constitutional Convention could easily 
agree on the basic principle that the federal government should han-
dle issues of national concern while states should handle issues of 
 
individual states.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison) (arguing that Con-
gress should have broad powers, but differs from Hamilton by arguing that Con-
gressional power is carefully limited to those purposes strictly enumerated in Ar-
ticle I). 
 87 Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 429, 430, 440, 485–87 (2004). 
 88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 89 Seidenfeld, supra note 83, at 3. 
 90 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 91 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
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local concern,92 they had difficulty agreeing on the best way to cabin 
together those two realms of sovereignty.93 The Founders eventually 
settled on the concept of enumerated powers,94 but this did not end 
the debate over such powers. Only a few years after ratification, in 
1819, the Supreme Court heard the landmark case of McCulloch v. 
Maryland, and held that Congress could, through the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, transcend any strict reading imposed by enumeration 
if Congress was legislating towards the end of an enumerated 
power.95 Foreseeing this exercise in line drawing was a feature, not 
a bug, of American federalism, Justice Marshall noted in his opin-
ion: “But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually 
granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, 
as long as our system shall exist.”96 
With respect to the Spending Clause’s boundaries, much of nine-
teenth century jurisprudence conformed with the Hamiltonian view 
espoused in McCulloch.97 This view, named by David E. Engdahl 
as the “Principle of Extraneous Means,”98 held that the Necessary 
and Proper clause brought “all matters potentially within Congress’s 
reach but permits Congress to reach them only insofar as it does so 
to effectuate one or another of the other enumerated federal pow-
ers.”99 Thus, as in McCulloch, Congress may act in a manner extra-
neous to its enumerated powers, if Congress is pursuing an end enu-
merated in the Constitution.100 As a corollary to this, Engdahl also 
posits that, throughout much of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
 
 92 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, JOURNAL OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION KEPT BY JAMES MADISON 62 (E.H. Scott ed., 1893) (1787) 
(discussing the role of the federal legislature: “the National Legislature 
ought . . . to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or 
in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual legislation.”). 
 93 Engdahl, supra note 21, at 5–6. 
 94 Id. at 7. 
 95 M’Culloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 411–24 (1819) (holding that 
Congress could establish a national bank even though such power was not enu-
merated and determining that the establishment of the bank was valid insofar as 
Congress deemed it necessary to carry out its taxing and spending powers). 
 96 Id. at 405. 
 97 Engdahl, supra note 21, at 11–12. 
 98 Id. at 13. 
 99 Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted). 
 100 Id. 
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century, the judiciary would have also understood the Spending 
Clause in the light of the “principle of extraneous ends.”101 That is, 
Congress is also justified to use whatever means it has available to 
pursue ends that are extraneous to its enumerated powers.102 There-
fore, applying both principles together, much of the early under-
standing of enumerated powers, including the Spending Clause, 
viewed each of Congress’s enumerated powers as quite substantial. 
In terms of the Spending Clause, under this view, Congress could 
constitutionally condition state acceptance of federal funds subject 
to any policy goals it deems fit.103 
This classic view began to shift in the early twentieth century 
when, due to a surplus in federal income tax, Congress was able to 
begin enacting a number of large federal spending programs.104 The 
seminal case that brought this issue to the Supreme Court was 
United States v. Butler, which although primarily about Congress’s 
taxation power, had important implications for limiting Congress’s 
spending power as well.105 The issue in Butler stemmed from Con-
gress’s enactment of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (the “AAA”), 
which allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to limit the production 
of certain farm products and tax farmers who exceeded that limit.106 
The AAA then appropriated those tax dollars to farmers who would 
reduce their yields of those crops.107 Butler, a crop processer, filed 
suit against the government arguing that the tax was not a tax, but 
rather a federal attempt to regulate agriculture, a power reserved to 
the states under the Tenth Amendment.108 
The Court ultimately sided with Butler, departing from the ear-
lier view of the enumerated powers and, puzzlingly, citing Hamilton 
as the basis for its departure.109 While the Court found that the tax 
and spending power was, as Hamilton proposed, not confined to the 
enumerated powers, there were limits to what Congress could or 
 
 101 Id. at 16. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See id. at 20–21. 
 104 David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending Power, 52 
S.D. L. REV. 496, 497 (2007). 
 105 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 106 Id. at 53–56. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See id. at 68. 
 109 Id. at 66–69. 
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could not do with it.110 The Court, in effect, determined that both the 
tax and spending powers were subject to the limitations of Tenth 
Amendment state sovereignty holding that, “Congress has no power 
to enforce its commands on the farmer to the ends sought by the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that it may not indi-
rectly accomplish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase 
compliance.”111 
Butler, effectively, began to draw a line between government 
spending that was contractual in the way that it moved state policy 
and spending that was more regulatory in nature.112 Thus, when 
spending is transactional, or, in other words when the federal gov-
ernment spends money to buy goods or conduct from the states, it 
engages in a willing transaction with the states similar to a con-
tract.113 Spending is regulatory in nature when the states are not a 
willing party and the outcome is more governmental in nature.114 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis clarified this limitation of the 
Spending Clause further, while simultaneously expanding the scope 
of federal power.115 Steward dealt with a provision of the Social Se-
curity Act’s (the “SSA”) unemployment compensation program that 
provided a 90% federal tax credit to employers on the program’s tax 
if those employers contributed to their state’s unemployment com-
pensation fund that met federal standards.116 As in Butler, the issue 
in Steward was whether Congress’s spending in the form of the na-
tional unemployment compensation program was a form of regula-
tion impermissibly encroaching on powers reserved to the states via 
the Tenth Amendment.117 In other words, the concern here was 
whether, through the tax credit, Congress was putting pressure on 
states to develop their own unemployment compensation fund that 
was in line with federal standards.118 
The Court sided with the government, finding Congress’s spend-
ing to be constitutional because it induced, rather than coerced, 
 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 74. 
 112 Seidenfeld, supra note 83, at 6–7. 
 113 See id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
 116 Id. at 573–78. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
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states to establish their own federally compliant unemployment pro-
grams.119 Justice Cardozo framed Congress’s enactment of a na-
tional unemployment program as a necessary response to a problem, 
the unprecedented number of unemployed persons during the De-
pression, that, while local in nature, had become national in dimen-
sion.120 As many states in the 1930s had been holding back on pass-
ing unemployment funds out of fear that it would place them in a 
“position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or 
competitors,” Cardozo described the SSA as a federal attempt to co-
ordinate cooperation with state governments for the betterment of 
the general welfare.121 The federal tax would help fund federal un-
employment resources if the states continued not to act, and the tax 
credit would push funding towards state programs that would reduce 
the burden on federal programs.122 Cardozo concluded his analysis 
by determining that this was not coercing the states to regulate, but, 
rather, merely encouraging them to regulate, which was not uncon-
stitutional.123 
Steward, therefore, allowed the Federal government to use its 
spending power to encourage state regulation;124 it clarified the 
boundaries somewhat further than Butler, suggesting that the issue 
was not about the distinction between a transactional relationship 
and a regulatory one, but, rather, about the distinction between a 
willing relationship and a coercive one.125 Thus, “if the federal gov-
ernment could establish a program directly, but it is more efficient 
or politically expedient to involve the states, there is no barrier to 
the federal government inducing state cooperation . . . to help im-
plement the federal program.”126 Steward, thereby, created an im-
portant foundation for the modern notion of cooperative-federalism, 
 
 119 Id. at 588–90. 
 120 Id. at 586–87. 
 121 Id. at 588. 
 122 Id. at 588–90. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See Seidenfeld, supra note 83, at 9. 
 125 Id. at 8–10. 
 126 Id. at 8–9. 
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in which state and federal governments work in conjunction with 
one another for the advancement of a common good.127 
Furthermore, by drawing the boundaries of federal spending 
power at coercion, Steward set the stage for the modern Spending 
Clause jurisprudence and the dimensions it would take on following 
Dole.128 Before moving on, however, it is important for the reader 
to understand how the Court in Steward understood coercive spend-
ing in this context, because such a distinction is not always obvious. 
In Steward, Justice Cardozo determined that the federal spending at 
issue was permissible because the government was, in effect, “buy-
ing” state regulation, not forcing the states to legislate by leveraging 
spending that it had already promised in exchange for regulation.129 
The latter would be coercive because, effectively, such a threat 
might not be related to the regulation the original spending was at-
tempting to “purchase,” and, thus, the federal government would be 
using the state’s reliance on the original spending to induce further 
concessions from the states.130 If, however, as in Steward, a condi-
tional grant of federal funding is related to the product on which 
those federal funds are going to be spent, such a grant would not be 
coercive because it did not alter the fundamental terms of the “con-
tract” between the state and federal government.131 
B. Dole, NFIB, and the Evolving Coercion Standard 
In 1984, Congress passed a law directing the then-Secretary of 
Transportation, Elizabeth Dole, to withhold federal highway fund-
ing from states that did not have a minimum drinking age of twenty-
one, which significantly reignited the argument around the 
 
 127 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Feder-
alism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 813, 858–59 (1998). 
 128 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 129 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590–91 (1937); Seidenfeld, 
supra note 83, at 9. 
 130 See Seidenfeld, supra note 83, at 9. 
 131 Id. (“The Steward Machine Court essentially held that the condition (the 
state adopting an unemployment-compensation program) triggering the discount 
of federal unemployment-compensation fees paid by employers (the spending) is 
related to the product on which federal funds are spent (federal unemployment-
compensation benefits) because a state administering its own program reduces the 
need for the federal government to pay out benefits.”). 
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boundaries of the Spending Clause.132 In South Dakota v. Dole, the 
crux of the issue was whether the provision to withhold spending 
unless South Dakota adopted a drinking age of twenty-one was co-
ercive and, therefore, an unconstitutional use of Congress’s spend-
ing power.133 South Dakota claimed that under the Twenty-First 
Amendment, the states were granted complete control over the im-
portation and sale of alcohol within their jurisdictions.134 Therefore, 
Congress’s threat to withhold funding was a usurpation of that 
power by indirectly attempting to set a national drinking age.135 The 
government responded by arguing that its use of the Spending 
Clause in this context was permissible because it merely encouraged 
states to conform to the national drinking age rather than forced 
them to do so.136 
The Court ruled for the government while further delineating the 
boundaries on government spending.137 Justice Rehnquist set out a 
four-part test for determining a permissible use of the Spending 
Clause: (1) exercise of the spending power must be in the pursuit of 
the general welfare, as specified in the Constitution; (2) if Congress 
conditions the states’ receipt of federal funds it must make such con-
ditions unambiguous to put the states on notice; (3) the conditions 
on federal grants must be related to a federal interest or national pro-
ject; and (4) conditional grants may not conflict with other constitu-
tional provisions.138 As the government’s withholding of funds here 
met all four parts of this test, its use of the Spending Clause was 
constitutional.139 
Justice Rehnquist did address the Steward coercion standard, but 
focused only briefly on it here.140 That is, Justice Rehnquist found 
that there was some connection between the condition and the funds 
being withheld: underage drunk driving threatened highway 
 
 132 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(A). See generally Elianna Spitzer, South Dakota v. 
Dole: The Case and Its Impact, THOUGHTCO. (May 5, 2019), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/south-dakota-v-dole-4175647. 
 133 Dole, 483 U.S. at 205. 
 134 Id. at 205–206. 
 135 See id. 
 136 Id. at 206. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 207–08. 
 139 Id. at 208–10, 212. 
 140 Id. at 208–10. 
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safety.141 Justice Rehnquist instead determined that the focal point 
of the coercion analysis should be the effects of the withheld spend-
ing.142 Under this test, Justice Rehnquist held for the government 
because the amount of federal funding being withheld here was 
small: only 5% of the funds it would otherwise receive under high-
way grant programs.143 In other words, South Dakota did not stand 
to lose much by not increasing the drinking age.144 Thus, to Justice 
Rehnquist, the amount of the funding being withheld was the critical 
point of a coercion analysis. 
As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her dissent, however, the 
funding being withheld in Dole, which was allocated for highway 
maintenance, had very little to do with the drinking age given that 
underage drinking was not a main cause of highway damage.145 
Thus, under a Steward analysis of the facts, the government’s with-
holding of funds would likely be unconstitutional. Rehnquist’s opin-
ion, however, shifts the coercion test to one of determining whether 
the amount of funding being withheld would cripple the states, such 
that the states would not have any other choice but to accede to fed-
eral demands. This understanding of coercion represents an im-
portant departure from the understanding of it in Steward. If with-
holding funds was considered unconstitutional, were it unrelated to 
the product on which those funds would be spent, as in Steward, 
then, in Dole, the analysis looks more at the consequences of remov-
ing funding. 
It follows that this shift in the coercion standard under Dole 
would have major implications for Medicaid expansion under the 
Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”). In NFIB, plaintiffs brought suit 
against the government challenging, among other things, the provi-
sion of the ACA that gave states additional funding on the condition 
that they provide health care to all citizens whose income falls below 
 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 211. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See id. 
 145 Id. at 213–15 (“[Congress] is not entitled to insist as a condition of the use 
of highway funds that the State impose or change regulations in other areas of the 
State’s social and economic life because of an attenuated or tangential relationship 
to highway use or safety.”). 
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a certain threshold.146 Plaintiffs contended that this expansion ex-
ceeds Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause because Con-
gress was also threatening to withhold all of a state’s Medicaid 
grants unless that state accepted the conditions that came with the 
expanded funding.147 
Justice Roberts sided with plaintiffs, largely applying the coer-
cion standard developed in Dole.148 Applying this “financial induce-
ment” test, Justice Roberts found that the Federal Government’s 
threat to withhold all Medicaid funding if states did not agree to the 
terms of Medicaid expansion was more than just a form of encour-
agement, it was “a gun to the head.”149 Justice Roberts argued that, 
while in Dole the amount of funding the government intended to 
withhold was relatively small (only 5% of federal highway funds—
a small portion of the state’s total budget), the threatened loss in 
Medicaid funding could be as large as 10% of a state’s total 
budget.150 This, he concluded, would leave “the States with no real 
option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”151 
Applying the Steward test, Justice Roberts largely underplayed 
the aspect of the test focusing on the relationship between the con-
dition and the funds being withheld, instead emphasizing more the 
coercive effects of the condition.152 Roberts characterized the Med-
icaid expansion as “a shift in kind, not merely degree,” discussing 
how the expansion was a dramatic departure from Medicaid’s orig-
inal mandate of, as Roberts characterizes it, “cover[ing] medical ser-
vices for four particular categories of the needy” to “meet the health 
care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below 
133 percent of the poverty level.”153 As in Rehnquist’s cursory anal-
ysis of the relationship in Dole, Roberts’s analysis on this point is 
also somewhat confusing when looking at the relationship between 
the condition and the spending at issue. In the Medicaid Act, Con-
gress very clearly stipulated that part of the Act’s mandate was to 
 
 146 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (“NFIB”), 567 U.S. 519, 541–42 
(2012). 
 147 Id. at 542. 
 148 Id. at 579–81. 
 149 Id. at 581. 
 150 Id. at 581–82. 
 151 Id. at 582. 
 152 See id. 
 153 Id. at 583. 
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furnish “medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent 
children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income 
and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical 
services.”154 Thus, the change in the amount of people covered 
would, indeed, be only a change in degree rather than kind if those 
covered had “income and resources [] insufficient to meet the costs 
of necessary medical services,” which they presumably would if 
they could not purchase other health insurance.155 
Justice Ginsburg made a similar argument in her concur-
rence/dissent.156 Justice Ginsburg argued that the shift in funding 
merely “embrac[ed] a larger portion of the Nation’s poor.”157 Ad-
dressing Robert’s coercion analysis of the effects of the conditional 
spending, Ginsburg found the amount of a state’s budget implicated 
somewhat irrelevant to the coercion analysis.158 Taking a Hamilto-
nian view of the Spending Clause, she held that states never really 
had a right to the Medicaid funds in the first place, and that such 
funding was only money “States anticipate receiving from future 
Congresses.”159 
While the strains of Steward and the early more expansive un-
derstanding of the Spending Clause still remain embedded in the 
law, since Dole, the trend has shifted away from looking at the pur-
pose of spending towards looking at the nature of the spending’s 
effects. Whether the “financial inducement” test is best for deter-
mining the boundaries of Congress’s Spending Clause powers is be-
yond the scope of this Note. If advocates do intend to push Congress 
to use the Spending Clause to induce states and municipalities to 
decrease both the number and enforcement of laws criminalizing 
homeless, advocates must be aware of these limitations so that they 
can achieve policy solutions that will not be found unconstitutional 
in the courts. 
 
 154 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1 (1984). 
 155 See id. 
 156 See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 640–41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
 157 Id. at 641. 
 158 Id. at 642–44. 
 159 Id. at 644. 
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III. CONDITIONAL SPENDING FOR ENDING THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS 
As in Steward, the criminalization of homelessness is a problem 
that is national in scope, but one which most states have not ad-
dressed in any substantive way.160 Such a problem invites a solution 
from the Federal Legislature to encourage states to move in a more 
humane and fiscally sound direction towards managing their popu-
lations of people experiencing homelessness. Understanding the 
limitations of the Spending Clause set out in Part II, this Note now 
turns to possible ways Congress could utilize the Spending Clause 
to induce states to remove, or lessen, enforcement of their laws crim-
inalizing homelessness. This Part begins by introducing readers to 
the key instruments that currently exist to fund state homelessness 
response programs. It then discusses strategies for using spending 
from those programs to influence state policy without being coer-
cive. 
The criminalization of homelessness is a multifaceted problem 
that implicates a number of government agencies and, therein, a 
number of sources of legislative funding.161 Thus, there are several 
places Congress could in theory condition funding grants on states 
and municipalities taking steps to end local laws criminalizing 
homelessness. Therefore, the first question in applying the Spending 
Clause jurisprudence discussed in Part II is where Congress should 
condition funds. 
As the holding in Steward established, coercive conditions are 
those that are generally unrelated to the underlying purpose of the 
grant being withheld.162 While this test was deemphasized by the 
majorities in both Dole163 and NFIB164 in favor of the Dole coercive 
 
 160 It should be noted that some states (Rhode Island, Connecticut, Illinois, 
and Puerto Rico) have passed Homeless Bills of Rights, which do attempt to curb 
criminalization of homelessness statewide. These states, however, are in the mi-
nority and most continue to allow laws criminalizing homelessness. See Sara K. 
Rankin, A Homeless Bill of Rights (Revolution), 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 383, 
403–04 (2015). 
 161 USICH, supra note 27 (noting that the USICH, the federal agency respon-
sible for coordinating national efforts around homelessness, is comprised of nine-
teen different federal agencies). 
 162 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590–91 (1937). 
 163 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
 164 NFIB, 567 U.S. at 582–83 (majority opinion). 
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effects standard, Steward remains good law, and the jurisprudence 
still exists in some strains on the court. Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s 
dissent165 in Dole and Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence/dissent166 in 
NFIB both signal that even if the relationship between condition and 
funds is no longer the main focus of a coercion analysis, it might 
still play a factor in future challenges to Congress’s use of the 
Spending Clause. 
Thus, the best place to start would be with programs already ear-
marked for homelessness spending. Congress has previously passed 
major legislation directly targeted at managing homelessness 
through the 1987 McKinney-Vento Act (the “MVA”).167 The MVA 
is a broad act targeted at addressing a wide scope of issues faced by 
people experiencing homelessness including funding for emergency 
shelter,168 housing assistance,169 and education.170 Additionally, the 
MVA created the USICH to broadly oversee enforcement of the 
Act.171 
In 2009, Congress reauthorized the MVA through the Homeless 
Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing (the 
“HEARTH”) Act.172 Twenty years after the MVA, the HEARTH 
reauthorization targeted many of the deficiencies in the original leg-
islation.173 The HEARTH Act strengthened the MVA in a number 
of key ways, including expanding the definition of homelessness to 
include many people left out of the MVA’s definition, such as those 
people experiencing homelessness who are “doubled up” and shar-
ing space with other people enduring economic hardship.174 The 
HEARTH Act also expanded the USICH’s mission to reflect the 
broad needs of people experiencing homelessness, e.g., “to coordi-
nate the Federal response to homelessness and to create a national 
 
 165 Dole, 483 U.S. at 213–15 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 166 NFIB, 567 U.S. at 641 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 167 McKinney-Vento Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301–11435 (1987). 
 168 42 U.S.C. §§ 11331–11352. 
 169 42 U.S.C. §§ 11360–11408. 
 170 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431–11435. 
 171 42 U.S.C. §§ 11311. 
 172 42 U.S.C. § 11302. 
 173 Nigel Graham, Lawmakers Propose the HEARTH Act to Aid Millions of 
Homeless Americans, 13 LOYOLA PUB. INT. L. REP. 60, 61–62 (2008). 
 174 Id. at 62. 
940 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:911 
 
partnership at every level of government.”175 The HEARTH Act in-
creased yearly federal funding for homelessness programs from $1.8 
billion to $2.5 billion.176 
Another important change that the HEARTH Act brought with 
it was that it created better lines of communication between the fed-
eral and local governments.177 Importantly, it consolidated many of 
the numerous MVA homelessness programs all within CoCs, 
streamlining local efforts into units with umbrella support.178 It also 
streamlined much of the funding for these programs through the 
CoC system, allowing for there to be centralized federal funding 
through HUD.179 
The MVA, as reauthorized by HEARTH, would likely be the 
best vessel through which to condition funding on states taking dras-
tic measures to end criminalization of homelessness. Conditioning 
funding grants on states ending criminalization of homelessness 
through the MVA would satisfy the Steward test because the condi-
tion would be directly related to one of the explicit purposes of the 
MVA grants: “to use public resources and programs in a more coor-
dinated manner to meet the critically urgent needs of the homeless 
of the Nation; and . . . to provide funds for programs to assist the 
homeless.”180 Given that, by USICH’s own admission,181 criminali-
zation of homelessness actively harms people experiencing home-
lessness, conditioning funding grants on reducing or altogether end-
ing enforcement of those policies would certainly be in line with the 
purposes of the MVA. 
Furthermore, there is strong evidence that such a strategy would 
be effective. In 2015, at the urging of advocates on behalf of people 
experiencing homelessness, HUD made a slight change to its annual 
 
 175 42 U.S.C. §§ 11311. 
 176 Graham, supra note 173, at 62. 
 177 See id. 
 178 NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, HOMELESS EMERGENCY 
ASSISTANCE AND RAPID TRANSITION TO HOUSING (HEARTH) ACT OF 2009 
SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS 6–7, http://endhomelessness.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2009/06/hearth-section-by-section-analysis.pdf. 
 179 Id. 
 180 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301(b). 
 181 SEARCHING OUT SOLUTIONS, supra note 42, at 7 (“[C]riminalization cre-
ates a costly revolving door that circulates individuals experiencing homelessness 
from the street to the criminal justice system and back.”). 
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CoC Program Notice of Funding Application, funding which flows 
directly from the MVA.182 The change allocated some funding dol-
lars to CoCs whose governments “implemented specific strategies 
to prevent criminalization of homelessness within the CoC’s geo-
graphic area.”183 While the change only applied two additional fund-
ing points, the shift in incentives it produced for cities to begin to 
reduce laws criminalizing homelessness was significant.184 The Na-
tional Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty found that since 
the change in HUD’s questionnaire, the number of surveyed CoCs 
who reported zero strategies to prevent the criminalization of the 
homeless declined “from nine to only one.”185 Furthermore, the re-
port found that from 2015 to 2017 the number of surveyed CoCs 
reporting community wide plans to decriminalize homelessness in-
creased by 11.9 percent.186 As this modest change from a federal 
entity shows, conditioning federal funding can have a significant ef-
fect at the state and local level in inducing change on this issue. 
Advocates should also bear in mind the definition of coercion 
that dominates the analysis of Dole and NFIB. Both cases focused 
on the amount of federal funds being withheld in relation to how 
much the state relied on those funds.187 If the amount of funding the 
federal government proposes to conditionally withhold is small 
enough that a state could plausibly reject it,188 then the jurisprudence 
suggests that such conditions will be upheld as constitutional. If, by 
contrast, the amount of dollars Congress conditionally withholds is 
so large that, the state would be crippled by the resulting budget 
 
 182 U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, NOTICE OF FUNDING 
AVAILABILITY (NOFA) FOR THE FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2016 CONTINUUM OF CARE 
COMPETITION TECHNICAL CORRECTION 35 (2016), https://www.
hudexchange.info/resources/documents/FY-2016-CoC-Program-NOFA.pdf. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, SCORING POINTS: HOW 
ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS CAN INCREASE HUD FUNDING 
TO YOUR COMMUNITY 6 (2018), https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/10/NOFAtoolkit2018.pdf [hereinafter INCREASE HUD FUNDING]. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–81 (2012); South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
 188 Such as a loss of only 5% of all federally granted highway funds. See Dole, 
483 U.S. at 211 (1987). 
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deficit if it rejected the funding,189 such a condition will likely be 
found an unconstitutional usurpation of state police powers. 
Within the MVA, determining the percent or portion of funding 
Congress should conditionally withhold from the States is beyond 
the scope of this Note. As the minor change in HUD funding shows, 
however, a change in the conditions for federal funding do not have 
to be large to get results in this space.190 The jurisprudential history 
resulting from Dole further proves this point: even though the 
amount of federal funds Congress threatened to withhold was small, 
every state in the United States currently has a drinking age of 
twenty-one.191 What is important is that the amount be large enough 
to pressure states to take steps towards decriminalization without 
being so large as to force the states to adopt the conditions to con-
tinue receiving any federal aid for their CoCs. 
CONCLUSION 
Should it be illegal for people to exist? In the United States, the 
answer to that question should be a resounding “no.” The Constitu-
tion explicitly provides that no government shall deprive a person of 
“life, liberty, or property without due process of law;” the Supreme 
Court interprets this clause to prohibit any government—state or 
federal—from passing laws that criminalize the separation of a per-
son’s existence from that person’s life-sustaining conduct.192 Out-
side of the law, the belief that all citizens are endowed with the basic 
rights to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” fundamentally 
 
 189 Such as a loss of 100% of all Medicaid funding, or upwards of 10% of a 
state’s entire budget. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (“NFIB”), 567 
U.S. 519, 580–81 (2012). 
 190 See INCREASE HUD FUNDING, supra note 184, at 6. 
 191 Age 21 Minimum Legal Drinking Age, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/minimum-legal-drinking-
age.htm (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 192 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 
U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding that laws criminalizing “vagrancy” are unconstitu-
tional under Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause because these laws 
“‘fail[] to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated 
conduct is forbidden by the statute,’” and “encourage[] arbitrary and erratic arrests 
and convictions.”). 
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influences American culture and law.193 And yet, virtually every city 
in America deliberately passes and routinely enforces laws that ef-
fectively make it illegal for millions of Americans experiencing 
homelessness to exist at all.194 
A legislative strategy focused on reducing or ending the crimi-
nalization of homelessness by attaching federal funding conditions 
would be an important first step in managing the homelessness epi-
demic in the United States. While ending or reducing the criminali-
zation of homelessness would not solve the problem of the lack af-
fordable housing in major metropolitan areas,195 it would force cities 
to consider alternate and more humane strategies to manage their 
populations of people experiencing homelessness.196 It follows that 
only when criminalization is off the table will states and municipal-
ities be forced to address the issue of homelessness in their jurisdic-
tions in more humane ways. 
Another important benefit of this strategy is that it would not 
necessarily require Congress to spend additional dollars to enact the 
change. Given that the funds for the MVA are already earmarked in 
the federal budget,197 Congress only need attach a condition requir-
ing states to reduce or abolish the criminalization of homelessness 
to the following year’s grant of funds. Thus, while Congress should 
allocate more funding towards homelessness assistance to give 
states a carrot as well as a stick in accepting federal funding, Con-
gress need not do so. 
This Note does not suggest that this is the only avenue advocates 
should pursue to end the criminalization of homelessness in the 
 
 193 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 194 See HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 12, at 9. 
 195 See NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS IN 
AMERICA: OVERVIEW OF DATA AND CAUSES 1, https://nlchp.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/10/Homeless_Stats_Fact_Sheet.pdf (discussing fact that main con-
tributor to homelessness is a housing gap of roughly 7.4 million units of affordable 
housing across the United States). 
 196 See Pottinger v. City of Mia., 359 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1183–88 (S.D. Fla. 
2019) (discussing how once consent decree largely removed criminalization as an 
enforcement strategy in the City of Miami, City was forced to pursue other strat-
egies to manage its population of people experiencing homelessness; these strat-
egies included more training for police officers, establishment of a city depart-
ment dedicated to homelessness outreach, more funding for local shelters, and a 
local food and beverage tax to fund these services). 
 197 Graham, supra note 173, at 62. 
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United States. Challenges to the criminalization of homelessness 
need to continue to be brought within the federal judiciary. Cases 
like Pottinger and Martin have been incredibly important in bring-
ing about substantial changes for people experiencing homelessness 
and have raised the national discussion on such issues.198 Further-
more, within the federal legislature, advocates should continue to 
fight for major bills on housing and homelessness assistance that 
work towards ending the root causes of homelessness. This Note 
merely suggests that advocates should also lobby Congress to adopt 
conditions against laws criminalizing homelessness, given that such 
conditional funding could either end or substantially reduce the 
criminalization of homelessness in the United States without impos-
ing extensive costs on taxpayers.199 Such a policy is not only appeal-
ing as a matter of basic human rights, but also as a matter of eco-
nomic sense. The criminalization of homelessness is, in no uncertain 
terms, cruel, inefficient, and expensive. Using Congress’s spending 
power to end the criminalization of homelessness would be, as Jus-
tice Cardozo put it in Steward, “for [no] purpose narrower than the 
promotion of the general welfare.”200 
 
 198 See Shelley, supra note 67; Eighth Amendment — Criminalization of 
Homelessness, supra note 73, at 706. 
 199 As the HUD CoC notice of funding change shows, all that would be in-
volved in a conditional spending change would be for Congress to rewrite the 
legislation granting MVA to include conditional language. Such an approach 
would not necessarily require a reallocation of funds. See INCREASE HUD 
FUNDING, supra note 184, at 6. 
 200 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587 (1937). 
